This thesis is about the procreative moral responsibilities of prospective parents that

intend to conceive, and the role of a parental virtue approach in encouraging

prospective parents to discharge these procreative responsibilities to their future

child without legal enforcement, or policing preconception and pregnancy.

Following an introduction, Chapter One considers if procreative moral

responsibilities exist, and if so, what they are. It identifies and explores key examples

of procreative moral responsibilities. It addresses who has them, when, and why. It

tackles the significance of the behaviour and character of prospective parents both

before conception and during pregnancy. It considers the significance of the

intention to conceive and the proximity to conception in terms of relevant capacity

(fertility) and behaviour. It examines why the choice to continue a pregnancy to

term and the choice to conceive both create procreative moral responsibilities, and

the relevance of an account of parental virtue in this context. It explains why

prospective parents that intend to conceive have procreative moral responsibilities to

their future child that begin before conception.

Chapter Two addresses whether the procreative moral responsibilities of prospective

parents are currently legally enforceable (in England and Wales) and whether they

should be. It explains what enforcement means, and argues that enforcement is not

currently within the role of the law or state. As legal change is possible, it argues that

enforcement should not be within the role of the law for ethical, legal and societal

reasons. Furthermore, it suggests that procreative moral responsibilities could not be

enforced, because enforcement via surveillance, intervention or sanctions is

impractical. Finally, the practical reasons against enforcement suggest that these

responsibilities are unenforceable.